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Abstract
Using a quasi-natural voting experiment encompassing a 160-year period (1848–2009) in Switzerland, we investigate
whether a higher level of complexity leads to increased reliance on trusted parliamentary representatives. We find that
when more referenda are held on the same day, constituents are more likely to refer to parliamentary recommendations
when making their decisions. This finding holds true even when we narrow our focus to referenda with a relatively lower
voter turnout on days on which more than one referendum is held. We also demonstrate that when constituents face a
higher level of complexity, they follow the parliamentary recommendations rather than those of interest groups. ‘‘Viewed as
a geometric figure, the ant’s path is irregular, complex, hard to describe. But its complexity is really a complexity in the
surface of the beach, not a complexity in the ant.’’ ( [1] p. 51)
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Introduction
As part of the recently revived commitment to correctly
describing or prescribing human economic affairs, social science
has been aiming to achieve a single, widely-accepted, and precise
behavioral theory of choice. Simultaneously, increased interest in
the idea that human rationality is bounded has generated a need
for a theoretical framework incorporating more realistic models of
human actors. As noted by Herbert Simon, a pioneer of this
concept [2–3], the principle of bounded rationality recognizes
limitations of the human mind in solving complex problems [1].
Indeed, Kahneman’s Nobel Prize exploration of the biases that
permit decision-making under complex conditions was an attempt
to map bounded rationality [4].
Almost a century ago, John Maurice Clark proposed ideas
about decision-making that are consistent with the concept of
bounded rationality and satisfaction [5]. Most particularly, Clark
stressed that decision making involves a level of attention and
effort that cannot be sustained for long because of limited cognitive
capacity. He linked this discussion to such works as Cooley’s
Human Nature and Social Order, which describes humanity’s tendency
to engage in a mechanical search for (among other things) an
accepted personal authority. Clark’s observations reflect the focus
of our research and the aim of this paper: we empirically
investigate whether a higher level of complexity leads to an
increased reliance on simple rules of thumb. To achieve this aim,
we explore whether humans rely on trusted representatives as a
rule of thumb when many problems demand simultaneous
concentrated attention, a topic on which, to our surprise, there
is little empirical evidence. Specifically, we thereby test bounded
rationality by analyzing constituents’ real voting behavior when
parliamentary members are the trusted representatives.
A rich model of voting behavior requires a good understanding
of voters’ attention and beliefs [6]. Switzerland offers a particularly
useful case study because the Swiss parliament provides ex-ante
voting recommendations for referenda, a standard method of
information provision that enhances its image as a trusted
consultant. Because in most modern democracies information
provision is delegated to politicians, interest groups, the govern-
ment, and/or professional information gatherers [7–8], constitu-
ents might be inclined to follow the recommendations of their
elected parliament, which is supposed to represent them.
Hypothesizing that voting decisions will be influenced by
parliamentary leaders who inform voters about the issues [9], we
identify the effect of public parliamentary voting recommendations
on constituents’ real choices in referenda (i.e., on the revealed
preferences of the constituents) over 160 years (from 1848–2009)
using parliamentary recommendations as the observable and
measurable variable. Given that citizens of the Nordic countries,
Switzerland, and Luxembourg tend to report the highest levels of
trust in their national parliaments and have the highest level of
overall trust in political institutions [10], it is not unreasonable to
suggest that Swiss constituents perceive members of Switzerland’s
parliament as trusted representatives.
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The Swiss parliament itself comprises two houses: the National
Council (Nationalrat), and the Council of States (Sta¨nderat), which
represent 26 parliamentary electoral districts (cantons or subna-
tional jurisdictions). Because Switzerland’s parliamentary system is
one of direct democracy through referenda, not only can citizens
from the different constituencies challenge any law passed by
parliament and propose initiatives, but a referendum is mandatory
whenever a parliamentary legislative proposal aims to change the
constitution. Citizens are assisted in their voting decisions by
political information provided ex-ante by the government [11–12].
Hence, referendum results in Switzerland not only determine
policy outcomes, they also reflect citizens’ preferences for these
outcomes. More precisely, referenda allow the majority to rank the
policy outcomes that will be generated by the proposed laws
against the status quo [13–15]. Referenda thus present dichoto-
mous results that indicate what is preferred by the majority and,
consequently, by the median constituent [15–16].
Because our study analyzes the outcomes of different referenda
which are held on the same day, we must take into account that
people have a narrow capacity for simultaneous attention to
different pieces of information [17]. In other words, humans can
only deal with a limited number of problems at one time. We
model the information complexity in our setting in two distinct
ways: (1) by differentiating referenda on days with more referenda
from those on days with only one referendum and (2) by
identifying referenda that receive a relatively lower turnout in a
constituency on days with more than one referendum. We expect
that when complexity is high–that is, several voting decisions are
asked for on the same day or turnout for the referendum is low–
voters will be more likely to follow parliamentary recommenda-
tions as a simple rule of thumb.
We recognize that the changing shape of the decision-making
environment may influence human goal-directed behavior over
time [6]; for example, over the long sample period, citizens have
grown up in very different social environments, with different
knowledge, information and social norms. Nonetheless, not only
does our institutional setting remain constant for the whole period
analyzed but even in complex situations the same basic decision-
making rule may apply, thereby enabling identification of any
common invariant of human behavior in decision-making.
To the best of our knowledge, no studies currently exist that
explore bounded rationality in such a real world context over such
a long time span. Hence, our setting is particularly well suited for
deriving empirical insights on the consequences of bounded
rationality in real voting situations. Moreover, by using voter
turnout, we can directly measure which issues receive more
attention, i.e., we can identify voters’ focus of attention, and offer a
clear explanatory heuristic for the decision process mechanism.
Hence, by employing simple rules of thumb to identify satisficing
decision outcomes [18], we can provide answers not only on which
decisions are made but also on how they are made, thereby
contributing to expand the knowledge of decision-making
processes with empirical evidence on procedural rationality. Another
advantage of the Swiss case is that the net cost of obtaining
information is less of a problem because parliamentary recom-
mendations are readily available in a booklet/pamphlet sent to
voters prior to a referendum. In fact, since 1877 the federal council
has been required by law to issue information detailing the
legislative proposal submitted. In other words, most of the
information needed for decision making is simply placed directly
into the voters’ hands (Figure S1). We therefore derive and
empirically test the following hypothesis: When more referenda are held
on the same day (thereby increasing decision-making complexity), voters will,
ceteris paribus, be more likely to refer to outside recommendations from the
parliament in their decision making.
Data
The availability of referendum voting data over a long time
period (from 1848 when the first national referendum was held,
until the beginning of 2009) stems from the stability of Switzer-
land’s institutional environment. Hence, our dataset comprises 555
federal referenda including counterproposals to citizens’ initiatives.
Because these frequent referenda present constituents with
dichotomous, inexpensive decision choices, they fulfill a central
requirement for valid identification of the use of rules of thumb
[19].
As Figure 1 shows, the average number of referenda per voting
day remained stable in all decades from 1870 until after World
War II and then increased only slightly (Figure S2 shows the total
number of referenda from 1848 to 2009). In Figure 2, we present a
histogram with the number of referenda per day over our sample
period excluding counterproposals, which are omitted because
they are always presented with the original referendum, making
the referendum a multiple decision between the status quo, the
proposed initiative, and the counterproposal. During the current
and past two centuries, there have been over 125 voting days on
which exactly one referendum was held; on the remaining days,
two or more referenda were on the ballot. All additional variables
employed in the analysis, their sources, and a number of
descriptive statistics are provided in the supporting information
(Table S1).
Results
To determine the probability that a constituency will accept a
referendum, we use a logit model in which the dependent variable
is a constituency’s acceptance of the referendum. For each
referendum, parliament either recommends a ‘‘yes’’ or a ‘‘no’’
vote and from this we construct the variable Parliament suggests YES.
We include one of our two measures for complexity: Number of
referenda on the same day and Low turnout referendum. As referenda are
preceded by a public discussion, such a discussion is more difficult
for constituents to follow if the number of referenda on the same
day increases. Recognizing that constituents are more likely to cast
a vote for a referendum about which they are better informed,
while constituents with little information may still vote but rely
more on parliamentary recommendations, our second measure for
complexity directly identifies voters’ focus of attention by using the
percentage of voter turnout on days with more than one
referendum.
An interaction term between Parliament suggests YES and the
respective complexity measures allows us to identify whether the
voters are applying simple decision-making rules in complex
situations. We also calculate discrete effects for the influence of the
parliamentary recommendation and the interaction terms, while
holding all other variables fixed at their medians [20], and report
robust clustered standard errors.
Specification (1) in Table 1 shows that the pseudo R2 is high for
a logit model (and indeed for this type of analysis) even though the
model includes no other controls apart from constituency fixed
effects (cantonal dummies). Because both interaction variables are
exogenous to constituent referenda choices, the interaction term
indicates the causal influence of parliament’s recommendation in
more complex voting situations; that is, when voters are faced with
more referenda on the same day. Thus, any variable not present in
the estimations can only be characterized as omitted if it influences
the interaction term directly, a contingency we control for in
Bounded Rationality and Voting Decisions
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subsequent estimates and refinements. As shown in Table 1, the
interaction term is highly statistically significant at the 1% level
(robust standard errors clustered for referenda) with a positive sign.
Thus, when there are more referenda per day, the parliamentary
influence on constituent decisions is larger. Specifically, the
discrete effects show that when only one single referendum is
proposed, constituents are 45.95 percentage points more likely to
vote yes when parliament recommends to vote yes, while the
interaction term indicates that this effect increases by 9.24
percentage points when the number of referenda increases from
one to three (the median on days with more than one referendum).
Specification (2) includes a dummy for counterproposals to
ensure that the observed effects are not a consequence of different
reactions to parliament when there is more than one referendum
and one is a counterproposal. We also introduce decade dummies
to capture technological and environmental changes that have
reduced the transaction costs of information, potential changes in
voter characteristics (e.g., average level of education), and/or a
shift to more referenda over time. Other changes that justify the
use of such time dummies include the granting women the right to
vote at the federal level in 1971 and the emergence of the new
canton of Jura. Including the counterproposal variable and decade
dummies, however, has barely any effect on our key variables: the
coefficient of the interaction term remains positive and statistically
significant with a comparable discrete effect (in fact, the
quantitative effect is even a little larger).
Specification (3) then restricts the sample to the 1884–2009
period to reflect the fact that voter turnout data are only
consistently available at the cantonal level from 1884 (before
there was no systematic registration of either the electorate or the
number of valid votes in all constituencies). Turnout not only
measures voters’ level of interest or how well informed they are, it
also covers such aspects as environmental conditions (e.g.,
weather). Controlling for this factor is important because voters
might stay away if they are not well informed, particularly in
situations where there is more than one referendum. Our results,
Figure 1. Average number of referenda per voting day in different periods. Since the first federal referendum in 1848, voters have usually
been given the chance to go to the polls between one and four times a year to make decisions on a minimum of one and a maximum of nine distinct
federal referenda issues.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084078.g001
Figure 2. Histogram of number of referenda on the same day from 1848 to 2009. The x-axis indicates the number of referenda on the same
day, and the y-axis shows the total number of referenda (without counterproposals) for the respective category. Although voters usually decide on
five or fewer referenda on the same day, since 1848, there have been occasions on which nine referenda decisions were made. Although seven
referenda decisions were made on May 17, 1992, there is no record of eight referenda decisions on a single day.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084078.g002
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however, indicate not only that turnout has no effect on the
interaction term but that the discrete effect actually increases
slightly to almost 11 percentage points. In other words, when more
referenda are held on the same day, the influence of parliament’s
recommendations on constituents’ real choices is significantly
higher. The base effect of turnout is also negative, which may
indicate that voters come to the polls if they disagree (status quo
bias). This finding, however, should not affect our quasi-
experimental setting with respect to the effect of parliament’s
recommendations in more complex voting situations and constit-
uents following a rule of thumb.
To fulfill our second aim (directly identifying the focus of
attention), specifications (4) and (5) include an interaction term
based on referenda with a relatively lower turnout within a
constituency on days with more than one referendum (Low turnout
referendum) instead of focusing on the number of referenda on the
same day. The data sample is thus restricted to cases with more
than one referendum per day. Because low turnout referenda are
identified at the cantonal level, we report robust standard errors
clustered by constituency in recognition of the likelihood that
observations in the same constituency are not independent. In line
with the previous results, the interaction term in specification (4) is
positive and statistically significant and the discrete effect, at 7.18
percentage points, is large. To ensure that the effects from the first
identification strategy do not overlap with those from the low
turnout referenda, we also control for the Number of referenda on the
same day. In line with the earlier analysis, we include the
counterproposals, check for the effects of turnout itself, and
include decade fixed effects (in specification 5). Throughout all the
estimations reported, the interaction term is statistically significant
at the 1% level with a discrete effect between 5.56 and 7.18
percentage points. All subsequent estimations include cantonal
and decade fixed effects.
Next, we refine our specifications as follows: in specification (1)
of Table 2, we analyze the interaction term using the dummy
variable More than one referendum instead of Number of referenda on the
same day. Again, the interaction is positive and significant, with a
discrete effect over 9 percentage points. To expand our analysis of
interaction terms, in specifications (2) and (3), we concentrate on
days with more than two or more than three referenda. In all
cases, the interaction term is significantly positive, and the discrete
effects increase with complexity, thereby confirming the effects
noted previously. Importantly, the interaction term also remains
significantly positive when we apply our second identification
Table 1. Parliamentary influence on constituent referenda choices.
Identification: Number of referenda
on the same day Identification: Low turnout referendum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years covered 1848–2009 1848–2009 1884–2009 1884–2009 1884–2009
Parliament suggests YES 1.7323***
(0.2742)
1.7403***
(0.2902)
1.7213***
(0.2922)
2.4834***
(0.1212)
2.5485***
(0.1227)
Parliament suggests YES * Number of referenda
on the same day
0.2641***
(0.0875)
0.3103***
(0.0963)
0.3068***
(0.0973)
Number of referenda on the same day 20.1950**
(0.0777)
20.1793**
(0.0827)
20.1832**
(0.0843)
0.0574***
(0.0107)
0.0748***
(0.0143)
Parliament suggests YES * Low turnout referendum 0.4010***
(0.1113)
0.2956***
(0.1140)
Low turnout referendum 20.1201
(0.1013)
20.0689
(0.1014)
Counterproposal 20.2083
(0.3073)
20.2979
(0.3110)
20.4030***
(0.0514)
Turnout 21.9731***
(0.4562)
21.4259***
(0.2443)
Constituency fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Decade fixed effects NO YES YES NO YES
DE Parliament suggests YES 45.9540 46.7379 46.5972 53.3954 53.5781
DE Parliament suggests YES * Number of referenda
on the same day
9.2357 10.8994 10.9059
DE Parliament suggests YES * Low turnout referendum 7.1800 5.5651
Clustering Referendum Referendum Referendum Constituency Constituency
Sample restriction .1 referendum .1 referendum
Pseudo R2 0.2996 0.3312 0.3505 0.3485 0.3671
Brier 0.1925 0.1853 0.1808 0.1812 0.1765
No. obs. 14127 14127 13502 9961 9961
Notes: The dependent variable for all logit estimations is Constituency accepts referendum. Robust clustered standard error estimates for referenda (columns 1–3) and
constituencies (columns 4–5) are reported throughout the table. An intercept is always included. DE denotes the discrete effects in the predicted probability. The
discrete effects for Parliament suggests YES * Number of referenda on the same day, and Parliament suggests YES * Low turnout referendum represent changes in
percentage points for the coefficients when all other variables are evaluated at their median values and the Number of referenda on the same day changes from one to
three (columns 1–3), and Low turnout referendum changes from zero to one (columns 4–5). ***, **, and * indicate a mean significance level of below 1%, between 1 and
5%, and between 5 and 10%, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084078.t001
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strategy for complexity (Low turnout referendum) in specifications (4)
and (5) restricting the sample accordingly.
Because interest groups may also give voting recommendations
that can directly influence referenda outcomes [21], our next step
is to investigate their effect in Table 3 using official interest group
voting recommendations, which were first officially collected in
1945. For this time period, we use data for seven groups whose
interests are, respectively, business, (Zentralverband schweizerischer
Arbeitgeber-Organisationen, Economiesuisse, and Schweizerischer Gewerbe-
verband), unions (Schweizerischer Gewerkschaftsbund and Travail.Suisse
which merged with Vereinigung schweizerischer Angestelltenverba¨nde in
2002), and farmers (Schweizerischer Bauernverband). Although other
interest groups and regional organizations exist, these seven are
arguably the most important and have the highest number of
active participants.
In this analysis, we evaluate only those referenda for which at
least one interest group made an official voting recommendation
and construct dummies that identify whether the interest group
Table 2. Refinement using number of referenda on the same day.
Identification: Number of referenda
on the same day Identification: Low turnout referendum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Years covered 1848–2009 1848–2009 1848–2009 1884–2009 1848–2009
Parliament suggests YES 2.1695***
(0.2763)
2.2591***
(0.2095)
2.3493***
(0.1986)
2.7116***
(0.1709)
2.5194***
(0.1566)
Parliament suggests YES *
More than one referendum
0.5883*
(0.3458)
More than one referendum 20.4734
(0.3164)
Parliament suggests YES *
More than two referenda
0.7403**
(0.3628)
More than two referenda 20.7052**
(0.3250)
Parliament suggests YES *
More than three referenda
0.8871**
(0.4141)
More than three referenda 20.3194
(0.3578)
Parliament suggests YES *
Low turnout referendum
0.5391***
(0.1538)
0.8113***
(0.1964)
Low turnout referendum 20.1951
(0.1260)
20.2158
(0.1582)
Number of referenda on the same day 0.1740***
(0.0229)
0.0850**
(0.0366)
Counterproposal 20.2180
(0.3051)
20.2126
(0.3056)
20.1930
(0.3080)
20.7686***
(0.0785)
20.4511***
(0.1032)
Turnout 23.1623***
(0.5265)
23.9928***
(0.8108)
Constituency fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Decade fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
DE Parliament suggests YES 49.1786 51.0306 46.4629 53.4686 53.0404
DE Parliament suggests YES *
More than one referendum
9.3615
DE Parliament suggests YES *
More than two referenda
10.5967
DE (Parliament suggests YES) *
(More than three referenda)
15.7919
DE (Parliament suggests YES) *
(Low turnout referendum)
9.1936 14.0232
Sample restriction .2 referenda .3 referenda
Clustering Referendum Referendum Referendum Constituency Constituency
Pseudo R2 0.325 0.3272 0.3307 0.4539 0.494
Brier 0.1862 0.186 0.1851 0.1551 0.1459
No. obs. 14127 14127 14127 6329 4015
Notes: The dependent variable for all logit estimations is Constituency accepts referendum. Robust clustered standard error estimates for referenda (1–3) and
constituencies (4–5) are reported throughout the table. DE =discrete effect in the predicted probability (see Table 1 and text for details). ***, **, and * indicate a mean
significance level of below 1%, between 1 and 5%, and between 5 and 10%, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084078.t002
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recommendations are divergent or whether all interest groups
suggested a yes vote. As Table 3 shows, if interest groups suggest a
yes vote, not only does the probability of constituents accepting the
referendum increase but the coefficient of the variable Parliament
suggests YES decreases (see specification 1). The goodness of fit of
the estimation increases compared to earlier estimates which
suggests that interest groups recommendations are an important
factor explaining voting decisions. We, however, are interested in
exploring whether, in more complex situations, voters tend to rely
more on parliamentary recommendations or whether interest
group recommendations play a larger role. We find that the
interaction term between the parliamentary suggestion and the
number of referenda on the same day remains positive, significant
and of similar size compared to earlier specifications (specification
1), whereas the interaction between interest group recommenda-
tion and the number of referenda on the same day is not
statistically significant (specification 2). Thus, once complexity
increases, constituents are more likely to follow parliament than
the interest groups. Such a finding remains robust even after we
restrict our sample to those referenda on which at least two interest
groups expressed an opinion (specifications 3 and 4). Likewise, in
specifications (5) and (6), which focus on the alternative complexity
variable Low turnout referendum, the interaction term Parliament
suggests YES * Low turnout referendum is statistically significant and
positive, while the coefficient of the interaction term for these
referenda and interest groups is again insignificant. In sum, the
results remain fully robust even when controlling for interest
groups or when the method for identifying complexity is changed
(i.e., we identify the voters’ focus of attention directly by measuring
the percentage of voter turnout). Overall, as complexity increases,
citizens are more likely to listen to elected politicians as trusted
representatives than to interest groups.
We report the results of additional robustness tests in the
supporting information. The first section takes into account that
Table 3. Parliamentary influence on constituent referenda choices in the presence of interest group recommendations.
Identification: Number of referenda
on the same day Identification: Low turnout referendum
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Years covered 1945–2009 1945–2009 1945–2009 1945–2009 1945–2009 1945–2009
Parliament suggests YES 0.8381**
(0.4152)
0.6415
(0.4584)
0.9773**
(0.4356)
0.7212
(0.4841)
1.8958***
(0.1579)
1.8679***
(0.1711)
Parliament suggests YES *
Number of referenda on the same day
0.3914***
(0.1065)
0.4495***
(0.1193)
0.3862***
(0.1148)
0.4641***
(0.1303)
Number of referenda on the same day 20.1971**
(0.0822)
20.1976**
(0.0824)
20.1828**
(0.0919)
20.1836**
(0.0920)
0.0811***
(0.0150)
0.1220***
(0.0197)
Parliament suggests YES *
Low turnout referendum
0.4466***
(0.1368)
0.6996***
(0.1566)
Low turnout referendum 20.1440
(0.1052)
20.3484***
(0.1201)
All interest groups suggest YES *
Number of referenda on the same day
20.1151
(0.1195)
20.1505
(0.1246)
All interest groups suggest YES * Low
turnout referendum
20.0234
(0.1128)
20.0310
(0.1183)
All interest groups suggest YES 1.9740***
(0.4395)
2.3426***
(0.5870)
1.9209***
(0.4462)
2.4120***
(0.6146)
1.8365***
(0.1899)
1.8812***
(0.2105)
Interest groups divergent 1.1326***
(0.4042)
1.1520***
(0.4107)
1.2477***
(0.3980)
1.2716***
(0.4068)
1.0542***
(0.1435)
1.3126***
(0.1738)
Control for Counterproposal and Turnout YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cantonal fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Decade fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
DE Parliament suggests YES 19.2457 16.3342 19.0234 15.4688 26.1650 21.1723
DE Parliament suggests YES *
Number of referenda on the same day
12.2643 14.5481 11.4972 14.3397
DE Parliament suggests YES *
Low turnout referendum
7.8740 8.8518
Sample restriction .= 1 interest
group
.= 1 interest
group
.= 2 interest
group
.=2 interest
group
.= 1 interest group
& .1 referendum
.= 2 interest groups
& .1 referendum
Clustering referendum referendum referendum referendum constituency constituency
Pseudo econdR2 0.4325 0.4334 0.4269 0.4286 0.429 0.4258
Brier 0.1632 0.163 0.1652 0.1648 0.1625 0.1643
No. obs. 10201 10201 8932 8932 8385 7516
Notes: The dependent variable for all logit estimations is Constituency accepts referendum. Robust clustered standard error estimates for referenda (1–4) and
constituencies (5–6) are reported throughout the table. DE =discrete effect in the predicted probability (see Table 1 and text for details). ***, **, and * indicate a mean
significance level of below 1%, between 1 and 5%, and between 5 and 10%, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0084078.t003
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the government’s executive council (the federal council) also
frequently makes recommendations on referenda, which means
that constituents may not only be influenced by parliament (Table
S2, columns 1–3). We also take account of minority positions in
parliament (Table S2, columns 4–6). The second section explores
different time periods in recognition of the post-1945 tendency to
hold more referenda on one day (Table S3). The third section
reports rolling regressions that omit one constituency at a time
(Table S4). All results support our earlier findings.
Discussion
To determine whether a higher level of complexity leads to an
increased reliance on trusted representatives in real voting
decisions, a topic on which there is surprisingly little empirical
evidence, we exploit a natural setting of voter practices in
Switzerland, whose institutional environment has been stable
since 1848. The dataset for this unique setting encompasses 160
years (1848–2009) of information on real voting behavior in
referenda. Our results suggest that when several simultaneous
problems demand concentrated attention, humans follow a simple
rule of thumb by relying on trusted representatives.
First, to test our prediction that holding more referenda on the
same day means a greater likelihood that constituents will seek
outside help, we use the number of these referenda to identify
parliament’s influence on constituent voting behavior in the face of
simultaneous problems that demand concentrated attention. We
find evidence that parliamentary influence is indeed greater when
there are multiple referenda than when there is only one
referendum per day. Second, recognizing that on days with two
or more referenda, constituents incur the same costs in turning up
for the first as for the second or third referendum on the same day,
we use turnout differences within constituencies to identify which
referendum on a given day attracted the most attention. The
strength of this empirical design is that we can use the percentage
of voter turnout to directly identify voters’ focus of attention when
decisions are to be made on multiple aspects. Not only are the
quantitative effects large, but they remain consistently so
throughout our robustness tests and refinements. We also control
for the effects of interest groups and show that constituents are
more likely to listen to parliament for their recommendations than
to interest groups. Thus, voters are, ceteris paribus, more likely to
refer to outside recommendations from the parliament in their
decision when the level of complexity increases.
If politicians deliberately bundle referenda they want pass, then
our findings of the increased likelihood of having a referendum
supported on a day with more referenda would represent a lower
bound estimate for the influence of parliament. Whether or not it
is the case that politicians bundle more referenda on a single day to
increase the power of their recommendations, our results provide
solid evidence that constituents do follow a rule of thumb in
complex and attention demanding situations.
Certain groups of voters might perceive specific issues as more
complex and rely more on parliamentary recommendations to
decide on them. Our study does not focus on referenda content.
However, the empirical identification and exploration of rules of
thumb necessitates a method for identifying environmental complex-
ity that is well suited to frequent repetitions [19]: More referenda
on the same day will dilute the attention of voters and thus make
decisions relatively more complex. Because constituents face a
repeated decision environment in which referenda occur frequent-
ly and the complexity level is approximated by the number of
referenda on the same day, we are able to directly identify which
cases attract less voter attention (i.e., which referenda have a
relatively lower turnout).
Overall, the empirical analysis suggests that, once the voting
task is held constant over a long period, a bounded rationality
framework may shed light on how people vote when complexity of
the decision environment changes. The simplicity of our setting
allows us to identify the effect of parliamentary voting recom-
mendations on constituents’ real choices. Most particularly, we
identify an invariance in voting behavior that almost resembles a
law of qualitative structure [22]. We also observe a tendency for
voters to follow the rule of thumb or heuristic that dictates reliance
on trusted representatives’ advice when many problems demand
concentrated attention simultaneously. As this behavior has
remained robust since the middle of the 19th century despite
environmental changes, it implies that a simple choice mechanism
underlies a substantial number of observed choices. Our empirical
analysis thus provides valuable insights into how humans use
limited computational capacity to handle differences in informa-
tion complexity, a type of complexity always present in modern
societies but particularly so in politics where managing the
distribution of scarce attention resources among competing
agenda is vital to policy formation [23].
Methods
The dependent variable yit in the tables is constituency
acceptance of the referendum. We perform a logit analysis of
the probability of such acceptance based on the following
generic estimation equation P(yit)~l(azb1x1zb2x1x2zb3x2zP
j
cjzj). l is the logistic function l(X )~e
X=(1zeX ), x1 denotes
parliament’s recommendation, x2 reflects either the number of
referenda on the same day (our first measure of a complex
environment) or referenda with a relatively lower turnout on the
same day (our second measure of a complex environment). The
coefficient b2 of the interaction between x1 and x2 reflects the
influence of parliament’s recommendation in a complex environ-
ment on the probability of a constituency accepting a referendum.
If constituents are boundedly rational, they will apply the simple
rule of thumb and follow parliament in more complex situations.
Thus, we expect that b2w0. Finally, the coefficients cj account for
the effect of additional control variables, turnout in particular but
also constituency and decade fixed effects.
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